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This long-running Oklahoma death-penalty case raises two issues:   1) Will the State of Oklahoma be permitted to execute Glossip, despite overwhelming evidence that he is innocent, and despite a confession by the State’s Attorney General that the state obtained his conviction by hiding crucial evidence impeaching its star witness?; and   2) Will the Court reaffirm its longstanding commitment to Due-Process-Clause precedent requiring the government to disclose favorable evidence in its possession to the accused and to correct false testimony introduced against the accused?

Federal and state constitutional law requires prosecutors to inquire into and disclose misconduct by members of their prosecution teams. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has applied those principles, and others, in cases that have led to the mass exoneration of people convicted of drug crimes with the assistance of former state chemists who committed misconduct. In Graham, the ÀÏ°ÄÃÅ¿ª½±½á¹û and public defenders are asking the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to apply those same principles to a situation where the U.S. Department of Justice has alleged a pattern or practice of misconduct by members of a police department—specifically, the Narcotics Bureau of the Springfield (MA) Police Department. The Springfield investigation was the DOJ’s sole pattern-or-practice investigation during the Trump Administration, but the DOJ has opened several such investigations during the Biden Administration. Graham appears to be the first state supreme court case in the country to consider whether DOJ pattern-or-practice findings can trigger duties under state law to investigate and disclose the misconduct alleged by the DOJ. In a major victory, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in January 2024 that the Hampden County District Attorney’s Office violated its duties to disclose and inquire about exculpatory evidence of widespread misconduct by Springfield police.

Whether the Fifth Amendment imposes any limits on the state's ability to introduce evidence derived from a court-ordered psychiatric examination of the defendant by the state's expert.