鈥淚 Like Ike鈥� is one of the most well-known and catchiest political slogans of all time. According to a decision that was issued by a federal judge in Virginia a few days ago, however, the modern-day equivalent鈥攕aying that you "like" a political candidate by using Facebook's "like" feature鈥攊s not even worthy of the protections of the First Amendment. That decision is wrong, whether you like or dislike Facebook.
The court鈥檚 appears to be premised on its belief that pressing a button to say that you 鈥渓ike鈥� something鈥攊n this case, a candidate running for election to be a city鈥檚 Sheriff鈥� is not 鈥渟ubstantive鈥� enough to be protected by the First Amendment. In the court鈥檚 words: 鈥淸M]erely 鈥榣iking鈥� a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection . . . It is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protection. The Court will not attempt to infer the actual content of [the plaintiff鈥檚] posts from one click of a button on [the candidate鈥檚] Facebook page.鈥�
It is hard to understand how revealing to the world that you 鈥渓ike鈥� a particular political candidate does not reveal one鈥檚 views or express an opinion. It does exactly that. That many people today choose to convey what they like or which political candidates they support by 鈥渓iking鈥� a web page rather than by writing the actual words, 鈥淚 like this web page鈥� or 鈥淚 like this candidate,鈥� does not matter, either from a practical or a legal perspective. Whether you press a 鈥渓ike鈥� button to express those thoughts or you press the buttons on a keyboard to write out those physical words, the end result is the same: you are telling the world about your personal beliefs and interests. That is exactly what the First Amendment protects, however that information is conveyed.
The court鈥檚 conclusion that pressing a button does not involve 鈥渆nough speech鈥� and that 鈥渓iking鈥� something is not a sufficiently 鈥渟ubstantive statement鈥� to warrant First Amendment protection is similarly wrong. First Amendment protection does not depend on how thoughtful, time-consuming, or 鈥渟ubstantive鈥� one鈥檚 comments might be, and the Supreme Court鈥攊ncluding the members of the current Court鈥攈as consistently efforts to limit the First Amendment to speech that is 鈥渧aluable.鈥� Nor does it matter whether the message in one鈥檚 speech is easily decipherable or if 鈥渓iking鈥� something really means that you truly 鈥渓ike鈥� something, in the traditional meaning of the word 鈥渓ike.鈥� As the Supreme Court vividly explained in one case, the First Amendment protects speech even if the speech does not convey a 鈥減articularized message,鈥� because otherwise, its 鈥減rotection would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.鈥�
But as wrong as the rationale of this decision is, perhaps the most troubling aspect of the decision is that it illustrates how difficult it still is for judges (and the public) to understand that just because the Internet and social media tools are new, that does not mean they should be treated differently from more traditional forms of communication. Over fifteen years ago, when use of the Internet really was new, the 老澳门开奖结果 went to court to establish the principle that speech on the Internet deserves the same First Amendment protections as traditional forms of speech. In its landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court agreed, unanimously (and wisely) holding that Internet speech is entitled to the exact same protections as all other speech.
That is still the law, but as this recent decision shows, we need to keep fighting to ensure that all new forms of speech, including ones most of us haven鈥檛 even imagined yet, are protected by the First Amendment, no matter how 鈥渄ifferent鈥� they may seem.
