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For years, Gavin McInnes has spewed bigoted views on everything from race and religion to gender and immigration. He has described a transgender person as 鈥淸a] who thinks he鈥檚 a woman;鈥� claimed that 鈥淢uslims with reckless abandon;鈥� and argued that a Black man who is 鈥渕istaken for a homeless man,鈥� should be 鈥渕ad鈥� not at the person who mischaracterizes him, but 鈥渁t who . . . created this stereotype in the first place.鈥� As a result, McInnes has made quite a name for himself.

Yet in a in February against the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), McInnes claims that it鈥檚 SPLC鈥檚 characterizations of him, not his own repugnant views that have given him a bad name in the eyes of the public. Specifically, he claims that SPLC has inaccurately characterized him as a 鈥渘eo-masculine reactionary鈥� and 鈥渟elf-described Islamophobe鈥� who founded a 鈥渉ate group鈥� and expresses 鈥渆xtremist,鈥� 鈥渂latantly misogynistic,鈥� and 鈥渁nti-gay鈥� views. Because he maintains that he should instead be referred to as a 鈥渟atirical鈥� and 鈥渞ebellious, humorist, businessman, political commentator and social critic,鈥� McInnes sued SPLC for defamation.

As by his attorney, his theory is, in part, 鈥淵ou may not agree with what I say. But I hope you鈥檒l fight with me for the right not be called a Nazi for saying it[.]鈥� It鈥檚 worth noting it was McInnes鈥� attorney who used the term 鈥淣azi鈥� 鈥� that one didn鈥檛 come from SPLC.

The problem with McInnes鈥� theory is: that鈥檚 not how the First Amendment works.

have held that individuals cannot be sued for calling out the views of others as racist, fascist, homophobic, radical, or sexist. As we and the Center for Constitutional Rights explained in a friend-of-the-court brief we submitted last week in support of SPLC, such statements of opinion criticizing hateful or bigoted views lie at the core of First Amendment protection. They enable us to express ourselves (including our disgust), they animate our political discussion, and they offer us a tool to persuade others. For debate on political issues to flourish, we must be able to express our views about the prejudices of others without fearing that a defamation lawsuit could arise from our words.

The Supreme Court emphasized the danger that defamation suits can pose to First Amendment freedoms in 鈥� a defamation lawsuit brought by a police commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama against four Black clergy members and the New York Times. The commissioner sued over a full-page advertisement in the Times describing an 鈥渦nprecedented wave of terror鈥� unleashed to quash widespread, peaceful protests by thousands of Black students as part of the Civil Rights Movement. Although the ad included some factual inaccuracies, the Supreme Court held that the public official had failed to establish a case because he had not shown that the Black clergy members and the Times spoke with 鈥渁ctual malice鈥濃�� that is, that they made the false statements knowing that they were false, or even with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.

In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized our 鈥減rofound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.鈥� This commitment, embodied in the First Amendment, enables us to vigorously debate ideas and push for political and social change 鈥� both by vocally embracing the ideas with which we agree, and by lambasting those we wish were no longer accepted by others in society.

We all have the right to express our views, McInnes included. And we equally have the right to disagree with 鈥� and even condemn 鈥� the views expressed by others. McInnes鈥� attempt to silence those who have every right to call him out for his bigoted views should fall flat. That鈥檚 how the First Amendment works.