老澳门开奖结果

Picture it. You鈥檙e online, ensconced in a muscled avatar, hacking your way through a World of Warcraft quest. A burly blacksmith appears on screen, and instead of brandishing a blunderbuss, turns to you and whispers: 鈥�.鈥� This might be your first clue that whoever is operating the blacksmith suit has things other than digital conquest on the brain.

In 2013, we learned that the Department of Defense, the CIA, British intelligence, and the NSA had engaged in (鈥淢MI鈥�) of role-playing games like Second Life and World of Warcraft, spying on the war making, guild building, and gold farming of our night elves and pandarian brewmasters. But perhaps the most surprising aspect of the MMI disclosure is the degree to which the government sees these cyberworlds as unclaimed turf in its war for mass psychological influence.

Psychological Operations or 鈥淧syOps鈥濃�攔ecently rebranded by the Defense Department as 鈥淢ISO,鈥� Military Information Support Operations鈥攎ight strike you as a Cold War relic. But even though the Iron Curtain gave way to a decentralized digital communications network, our government continues to try to influence the 鈥溾�� of foreign audiences. Lest you believe the era of is over, the year鈥檚 disclosures by Edward Snowden reveal just the opposite鈥攖hat military messaging is very much . And in the virtual realms of Second Life and World of Warcraft, MISO is heating up.

In December, ProPublica and The New York Times web-published a and a redacted, undated 鈥溾�� by defense contractor , revealing massive government infiltration of games and social networks. The memo warns that gaming platforms can be a 鈥渞adicalizing medium鈥� for terrorist recruiters, and to avoid losing the high-stakes game of cyber-influence, the SAIC primer advises that:

• An 鈥渋n-game presence鈥� would allow intelligence agencies to identify 鈥渋mportant propaganda efforts鈥� and work with the game producers to 鈥�eliminate harmful or misleading information from the game space.鈥� [All italics added]
• Agents in avatar can exploit 鈥�optimal message placement areas鈥� online to place 鈥渃ounterpropaganda鈥� messages of their own.
• Agents can even build relationships with influential avatars or guilds 鈥渢o facilitate 鈥榲iral鈥� message spread or in-game dialogue for propaganda purposes.鈥�
• Most concerning, the military contracts its propaganda out to private firms, sometimes operating under 鈥�,鈥� sometimes using misattribution or stolen identities to obscure its source.

On the sunny side of the Iron Curtain, Americans were protected from government propaganda by the Cold War-era Smith-Mundt Act, which banned the State Department from releasing its anti-Soviet propaganda to American audiences. By all accounts, the Act banned domestic military propaganda, too鈥攁 separation of politics and defense considered a feature of a healthy democracy.

Last year, Congress Smith-Mundt鈥檚 dated restraints, which were almost exclusively effective at for State Department programming under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). As we said then, a ban on Americans鈥� access to the States鈥� overseas broadcasts is both 鈥渉ighly paternalistic and a nightmare for government transparency.鈥� But the concerns that gave rise to Smith-Mundt鈥攚ritten at the Cold War鈥檚 inception, while the Stasi was consolidating in East Germany鈥攔emain just as salient. An influential public radio broadcaster is light years away from the covert monitoring of our private lives and the infiltration of our relationships by secret police that the MMI documents insinuate.

We don鈥檛 know how repeal of the State Department鈥檚 domestic broadcast restrictions has affected the military. And with forces increasingly deploying to cyberspace, the idea that the Pentagon is confining its propaganda activities to non-American users seems, frankly, laughable. For example, one of the DOD鈥檚 containment plans was to use British spelling and diction on some of its regional 鈥済ood news鈥� sites鈥斺�渏ust to make sure that it is understood to ever target American citizens or American readers.鈥� And

We agree with the Government Accountability Office when it said in its of Defense propaganda that 鈥淢ISO activities have the potential to undermine the credibility of the United States.鈥� Taking note of the report, Congress the $22 million Trans Regional Web Initiative, the placed by the DOD to sway 鈥渢arget鈥� ( ) audiences. But taking down the (vaguely) attributed MISO won鈥檛 stop the unattributed MISO from going up.

Without the policies and procedures guiding the Defense Department鈥檚 MISO and other information activities, Americans who read, congregate, network, and play online may become the unwitting 鈥攐谤 鈥攐f covert propaganda by their own military, or by contractors outside of the military鈥檚 chain of command. That鈥檚 why the 老澳门开奖结果 has filed a FOIA request, demanding that the Department of Defense and the NSA explain the rules of engagement for using propaganda against Americans鈥攚hether they鈥檙e at home, abroad, or somewhere on Second Life.