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There鈥檚 a lot the Senate can and should do to improve upon the version of the USA Freedom Act passed by the House of Representatives last week. (My colleague Gabe Rottman outlines some of the most necessary changes .) That includes one of the most troubling aspects of the agency鈥檚 phone-records program: the shadow database of Americans鈥� phone records, otherwise known as the 鈥渃orporate store.鈥� Trouble is, the bill鈥檚 language, as passed out of the House, makes it impossible to know whether the provision would actually add urgently needed privacy protections.

As I鈥檝e explained previously, the 鈥渃orporate store鈥� is an NSA database that intelligence officials almost never discuss, yet it likely contains an enormous number of Americans鈥� phone records. For years, it鈥檚 where the NSA has pooled the phone records of every person within one, two, or three 鈥渉ops鈥� of a target. One independent government estimated that the NSA added more than 120 million call records to the corporate store in 2012 alone, through just 300 queries of the raw phone data it collects in bulk. You can also look at it this way: To be added to the corporate store today, you would have to do little more than order take-out from the same restaurant as an NSA target. And once you鈥檙e in there, NSA analysts can analyze and data-mine your sensitive information any way they want.

(For a full explanation of the corporate store, click here.)

The new legislative would address this backdoor into Americans鈥� phone records by directing the government to adopt procedures that 鈥渞equire the prompt destruction鈥� of all phone records the NSA 鈥渄etermines are not foreign intelligence information.鈥� That鈥檚 a good start, but it still leaves all the important details for another day and puts them in the hands of the very same intelligence agencies that have been secretly exploiting Americans鈥� phone records for years.

With a few revisions, however, the Senate could significantly strengthen this provision to more fully protect Americans鈥� privacy:

• The Senate should mandate a specific timeline for NSA to purge data that does not have demonstrable intelligence value. Right now, the provision does not define what it means by 鈥減rompt,鈥� nor does it explain what a determination of foreign-intelligence value involves. Instead, a 鈥渞eview it, or lose it鈥� rule should apply. By default, NSA should be required to purge data that it has not affirmatively concluded has intelligence value.
• The Senate should impose specific limits on the NSA鈥檚 use of data that remains in the corporate store. To begin with, it should adopt the unanimous of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to restrict queries of the corporate store with the same 鈥渞easonable, articulable suspicion鈥� standard that applies to NSA鈥檚 queries of the raw phone data.
• The Senate should limit retention of data in the corporate store to counterterrorism purposes, not any foreign intelligence purpose. Queries of the raw phone data can only be conducted for counterterrorism purposes. The same rules should apply to the corporate store.
• The Senate should ensure that the FISA Court approves 鈥� and publishes 鈥� any minimization procedures governing the retention and dissemination of data in the corporate store, rather than leaving the procedures solely up to executive branch officials to adopt and apply in secret.

Senators should seize the opportunity to strengthen their colleagues鈥� much-needed reforms to the corporate store. Americans who have done nothing wrong shouldn鈥檛 have to fear that their government is analyzing their personal data simply because they happened to dial the same number as an NSA target.

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