老澳门开奖结果

It鈥檚 becoming clearer by the week that was not unique.

Last month a federal judge granted the habeas corpus petition of Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman (PDF), a young Yemeni detainee who was arrested in December 2001 and transferred to Guant谩namo in January 2002. The U.S. alleged that Uthman, who was 20 at the time he was captured, was one of Osama bin Laden鈥檚 bodyguards. That allegation rested on the statements of two other Guant谩namo detainees, Sharqwi Abdu Ali Al-Hajj and Sanad Yislam Ali Al Kazimi: Hajj told interrogators he鈥檇 met Uthman at a meeting bin Laden attended in Afghanistan shortly after 9/11, and Kazimi identified a photograph of Uthman for his interrogators and said 鈥渉e heard鈥� that Uthman had become a bodyguard for bin Laden.

As with Binyam Mohamed, it turns out these statements were gathered at Bagram air base after the two men had been tortured, first in foreign dungeons and then in the CIA鈥檚 鈥淒ark Prison.鈥�

And as in 鈥� when Judge Gladys Kessler ruled that information Binyam Mohamed provided that incriminated Bin Mohammed was inadmissible because of his treatment in Pakistan, Morocco, and the Dark Prison 鈥� Judge Henry Kennedy, Jr. ruled last month in Uthman鈥檚 case that

The Court will not rely on the statements of Hajj or Kazimi because there is unrebutted evidence in the record that, at the time of the interrogations at which they made the statements, both men had recently been tortured.

As Judge Kennedy wrote:

Uthman has submitted to the Court a declaration of Kristin B. Wilhelm, an attorney who represents Hajj, summarizing Hajj鈥檚 description to her of his treatment while in custody. The declaration states that while held in Jordan, Hajj 鈥渨as regularly beaten and threatened with electrocution and molestation,鈥� and he eventually 鈥渕anufactured facts鈥� and confessed to his interrogators鈥� allegations 鈥渋n order to make the torture stop.鈥� After transfer to a secret CIA-run prison in Kabul, Afghanistan, Hajj was reportedly 鈥渒ept in complete darkness and was subject to continuous loud music.鈥�

Uthman also submitted a declaration of Martha Rayner, a Professor at Fordham University Law School who represents Kazimi, regarding Kazimi鈥檚 description of his treatment in detention. Rayner reports that while Kazimi was held in the United Arab Emirates, his interrogators beat him; held him naked and shackled in a dark, cold cell; dropped him into cold water while his hands and legs were bound; and sexually abused him. Kazimi told Rayner that eventually 鈥淸h]e made up his mind to say 鈥榊es鈥� to anything the interrogators said to avoid further torture.鈥� According to Rayner鈥檚 declaration, Kazimi was relocated to a prison run by the CIA where he was always in darkness and where he was hooded, given injections, beaten, hit with electric cables, suspended from above, made to be naked, and subjected to continuous loud music. Kazimi reported trying to kill himself on three occasions. He told Rayner that he realized 鈥渉e could mitigate the torture by telling the interrogators what they wanted to hear.鈥� Next, Kazimi was moved to a U.S. detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan, where, he told Rayner, he was isolated, shackled, 鈥減sychologically tortured and traumatized by guards鈥� desecration of the Koran鈥� and interrogated 鈥渄ay and night, and very frequently.鈥� Kazimi told Rayner he 鈥渢ried very hard鈥� to tell the interrogators at Bagram the same information he had told his previous interrogators 鈥渟o they would not hurt him.鈥�

Once again, the position of the U.S. government 鈥� this time advanced by the Obama administration 鈥� was that because the Bagram 鈥渃lean team鈥� interrogations did not involve torture, statements the men made at Bagram should be admissible. Once again, a federal judge rejected this position, finding that the treatment the men had been subjected to in Jordan and another country undermined the reliability of their statements in Bagram.

I鈥檝e spent the last few months trying to absorb the full implications of the 鈥淧onzi scheme鈥� we covered in Chapter 4. Now, with the Uthman habeas ruling, we鈥檙e left to consider what it means that this chapter was not an isolated horror, but rather one episode in a much larger story in which scores of characters 鈥� U.S. interrogators, rendition crews, U.S. and foreign government officials, foreign jailers and torturers, CIA jailers and torturers, FBI 鈥渃lean teams,鈥� U.S. military jailers at Bagram and Guant谩namo, just for starters 鈥� played specific, well-defined roles again and again over the course of several years. We鈥檙e faced with the scope and utter deliberateness of the scheme.

To read more about and see documentary evidence of the Bush administration's torture program, go to .