老澳门开奖结果

The Obama administration released a today of the numbers of 鈥渘on-combatants鈥� it has killed outside actual war zones primarily through targeted killing strikes, as well as a new aimed at creating new transparency and accountability rules for such strikes.

Unfortunately, both the release and the new order fall far short of the standards for transparency and accountability needed to ensure that the government鈥檚 targeted killing program is lawful under domestic and international law.

While the 老澳门开奖结果 will continue to digest the new information and react to the government鈥檚 new statements, a few points are worth emphasizing right off the bat:

First, the government鈥檚 very use of the term 鈥渘on-combatant,鈥� rather than 鈥渃ivilian,鈥� in reporting its numbers exposes one of its most dangerous and far-reaching premises: That even 鈥渙utside areas of active hostilities,鈥� it need only apply the looser, law-of-war standards that govern conduct in war, rather than the more protective rules that apply under international human rights law. In short, the government continues to insist 鈥� unlike virtually every other nation on Earth 鈥� that even outside of a war zone, it is still at war. For an administration that came to power on the strength of promises to unwind the Bush administration鈥檚 鈥淕lobal War on Terror,鈥� this remains a significant policy failure and disappointment.

Second, the released by the government today 鈥� specifically, that it has killed between 64 and 116 鈥渘on-combatants鈥� in lethal-force strikes between January 20, 2009 and December 31, 2015 鈥� are dramatically lower than those documented by independent journalists and human rights groups. Those groups鈥� estimates have from 200 to 1000 civilians killed during President Obama鈥檚 two terms. As my colleague Hina Shamsi explained today, 鈥渋t鈥檚 hard to credit the government鈥檚 death count.鈥�

The government claims that it has taken into account credible reports of civilian deaths from such groups, but its explanation for the vast discrepancy 鈥� that it has 鈥渋nformation that is generally unavailable to non-governmental organizations鈥� 鈥� boils down to 鈥渢rust us.鈥� The government should not only take credible outside reports into account when releasing summarized statistics, it should investigate and publicly explain such strikes to the fullest extent possible. (For example, indicate that a U.S. drone killed 12 members of a wedding party in Yemen in 2013, and that the government paid compensation to the families of the victims 鈥� but the government has never publicly acknowledged responsibility for the strike, nor offered an explanation for it.)

Third, the government鈥檚 newly released information continues to conceal the specific definitions that guide its judgments about who it can kill, where, and why. In a May 2013 鈥�,鈥� the government explained that before it uses lethal force, it must determine that a target 鈥減oses a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons鈥�; that there is a 鈥淸n]ear certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed鈥�; and that capture of the target is not 鈥渇easible,鈥� among other requirements. But it has never provided definitions of these terms, or the evidentiary standards required to meet them, making it all but impossible to evaluate whether they are sufficient under the law.

To its credit, the government鈥檚 new release does mention some of the broad criteria it evaluates to determine whether someone is a 鈥渃ombatant.鈥� But it continues to keep secret the most important aspects of its legal and policy positions. (In response to an 老澳门开奖结果 lawsuit, a district court in New York will soon publish a redacted version of the secret document summarized by the 鈥渇act sheet,鈥� known as the Presidential Policy Guidance. Whether the release of the PPG will help answer these questions, or raise even more, is unknown, as my colleague Jameel Jaffer earlier this week.)

Finally, the government that its release is intended to 鈥渋nstitutionalize and enhance best practices regarding U.S. counterterrorism operations and other U.S. operations involving the use of force, as well as to provide greater transparency and accountability regarding these operations.鈥� The new , for example, requires an annual report summarizing numbers of 鈥渘on-combatants鈥� killed in 鈥渁reas outside active hostilities.鈥� As explained above, the newly released statistics are insufficiently detailed and nearly impossible to evaluate 鈥� as Shamsi put it, 鈥渧irtually meaningless.鈥� And because they are enshrined in an executive order, and not legislation, the government鈥檚 new 鈥渞ules鈥� can be wiped away with the mere stroke of the next president鈥檚 pen. (In a clear example of do-as-I-say-and-not-as-I-do, the order commits future administrations to reporting death counts on an annual basis, even though President Obama鈥檚 report aggregates data from seven full years of his administration.)

To be sure, today鈥檚 disclosures were a positive step, especially considering that for years the administration insisted that releasing even the most basic information about the targeted killing program would harm national security. But the new statistics are but an inch deep, and the new promises sound more than a bit hollow.

This administration still has time to make the kind of meaningful disclosures about targeted killings that Americans deserve 鈥� but that time is running out.