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This morning, we鈥檙e thankful for John Oliver for tackling FBI v. Apple in a way that only he can.

Last night鈥檚 episode of "Last Week Tonight" made excellent use of Oliver鈥檚 wit to explain the recent faceoff that has law enforcement demanding Apple help it break its way into an iPhone belonging to one of the San Bernardino shooters. The FBI claims that it only wants access to this one phone, but Oliver makes the precedent at stake clear.

鈥淭hink of the government as your dad,鈥� Oliver jokes. 鈥淚f he asks you to help him with his iPhone, be careful 鈥� because if you do it once you're gonna be doing it 14 times a day.鈥� It鈥檚 an apt comparison. Law enforcement is already chomping at the bit 鈥� Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance that he has 175 phones he鈥檇 like Apple鈥檚 help unlocking, and other law enforcement officials around the country have said the same.

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The issue is even more fundamental than the security of Apple's products. The FBI, Oliver explains, wants all encryption to be weak enough to allow access when law enforcement wants it. But if it wins, no company will be able to ensure the safety of its customers鈥� data from the prying eyes of malicious actors. As a mock Apple ad at the end of the episode rightfully notes, 鈥淲e鈥檙e only one step ahead of hackers at all times.鈥�

鈥淚t鈥檚 a hugely complicated story with massive implications,鈥� Oliver starts off, 鈥渁nd once we get to the end of it, you may not feel the same way that you do now.鈥�

It鈥檚 true. Even Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), once a vocal supporter of undermining encryption, said in a Senate Judiciary hearing last week that by the national security arguments for strong encryption.

Oliver sums up: "When you consider all this 鈥� the legal tenuousness of FBI鈥檚 claim, the security risks of creating a key, the borderline impossibility of perfectly securing the key, the international fallout of creating a precedent, and the fact that a terrorist could circumvent all of this by downloading whatever the fuck 鈥楾hreema鈥� is 鈥� it鈥檚 enough to sway the most strident opinion."

We agree, which is why the FBI鈥檚 demands in the San Bernardino case, where just last week, the government filed a arguing that technology companies should be faulted for creating secure devices, rather than applauded for doing so. We think that鈥檚 exactly backward, and a shortsighted view that prioritizes immediate law enforcement needs over longterm security and privacy.