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Peter Beinart recently published a very interesting on the Daily Beast making an argument that, if correct, could have very significant implications for privacy and other civil liberties in coming decades.

In essence, Beinart argues that the Reagan era has come to an end.

Historians often speak of the period from 1932 through 1980 as the 鈥攁 period characterized by a Democratic political majority made possible by a coalition of Southern whites, northern liberals, African Americans, and unions. Although the Democrats won some battles and lost others, the political debates of the era were defined by the Democrats to such an extent that even when they lost, they often won, as when Richard Nixon supported policies that were pro-environment, pro-Social Security, and pro-national health care.

The realignment of 1980 represented the end of that era, and its replacement by a more conservative one in which a new 鈥渋ntergenerational debate鈥� (as Beinart terms it) took place 鈥渂etween the yard lines Reagan and Clinton set out.鈥� In this era, the Republicans often won even when they lost, as Bill Clinton for example rolled back welfare benefits.

Beinart argues that for political purposes 鈥済enerations鈥� do not conform to the usual categories of the Silent Generation, Boomers, Gen-Xers, and Millennials鈥攂ut are defined by historical events.

To understand what constitutes a political generation, it makes more sense to follow the definition laid out by the early-20th-century sociologist Karl Mannheim. For Mannheim, generations were born from historical disruption. As he argued鈥攁nd later scholars 鈥攑eople are disproportionately influenced by events that occur between their late teens and mid-twenties. During that period鈥攂etween the time they leave their parents鈥� home and the time they create a stable home of their own鈥攊ndividuals are most prone to change cities, religions, political parties, brands of toothpaste. After that, lifestyles and attitudes calcify.

And politics in recent decades, he argues, has been defined by this dynamic:

the men and women who today dominate American politics constitute a political generation because during their plastic years they experienced some part of the Reagan-Clinton era. That era lasted a long time. If you are in your late 50s, you are probably too young to remember the high tide of Kennedy-Johnson big government liberalism. You came of age during its collapse, a collapse that culminated with the defeat of Jimmy Carter. Then you watched Reagan rewrite America鈥檚 political rules. If you are in your early 鈥�40s, you may have caught the tail end of Reagan. But even if you didn鈥檛, you were shaped by Clinton, who maneuvered within the constraints Reagan had built.

The Millennial Generation, however, is likely to become a new 鈥減olitical generation,鈥� Beinart argues.

By pre-Reagan standards, the economic debate is taking place on the conservative side of the field. But鈥攁nd this is the key point鈥攖here鈥檚 reason to believe that America鈥檚 next political generation will challenge those limits in ways that cause the leaders of both parties fits.

Beinart argues that the defining event for this new generation was not 9/11 as one might think, but an economy that has performed very poorly since the recession of 2001鈥攅specially for the young鈥攁nd the decline of government support for higher education, which has left this generation with more debt than its predecessors. Beinart marshals polling data across many issue areas to argue that these experiences and others have created a generation that is far more liberal than its predecessors.

So what does all this have to do with privacy and civil liberties?

Although Beinart鈥檚 analysis is focused on economic issues and on the partisan political implications of this shift, as he notes in passing, Millennials in polls tend to put a far higher priority on civil liberties over security. Beinart notes that the Pew Research Center has consistently found that Millennials, unlike all the older generations, reject the idea that 鈥渋t will be necessary for Americans to give up some civil liberties鈥� to curb terrorism. Fully 72% of Millennials answered 鈥渘o鈥� to that question , while the other age groups were all evenly divided. That was well before the revelations by Edward Snowden (who I would note is himself 30 years old). I would add that in a July 2013 post-Snowden , Millennials said by a two-to-one margin (60%-29%) that the government had gone too far in restricting civil liberties rather than not going far enough to protect the country. Although other age groups now agreed, it was by distinctly smaller margins. Millennials were also to say that the NSA release 鈥渟erves the public interest.鈥� A similarly found that 鈥淎mericans aged 18 to 34 break from older generations in showing far more support for Snowden鈥檚 actions,鈥� with just 19 percent of that age group saying that his whistleblowing was a 鈥渂ad thing.鈥�

I would add one additional factor to the polling data. Beinart argues that Millennials are likely to break outside the boundaries of political debate as they have been defined in the Reagan-Clinton era, and that this generation鈥檚 radicals are much more likely to 鈥渄isrupt social order鈥� than those of the 鈥淩eagan-Clinton era.鈥�

Look at the forces that created Occupy Wall Street. The men and women who assembled in September 2011 in Zuccotti Park bore three key characteristics. First, they were young. According to a survey published by City University of New York鈥檚 Murphy Institute for Worker Education and Labor, 40 percent of the core activists involved taking over the park were under 30 years old. Second, they were highly educated. Eighty percent possessed at least a bachelors鈥� degree, more than twice the percentage of New Yorkers overall. Third, they were frustrated economically. According to the CUNY study, more than half the Occupy activists under 30 owed at least $1,000 in student debt. More than a one-third had lost a job or been laid off in the previous five years. In the words of David Graeber, the man widely credited with coining the slogan 鈥淲e are the 99 percent,鈥� the Occupy activists were 鈥渇orward-looking people who had been stopped dead in their tracks鈥� by .

For a moment, Occupy shook the country. At one point in December 2011, Todd Gitlin points out in , the movement had branches in one-third of the cities and towns in California. Then it collapsed鈥�.

But the forces that drove it are unlikely to subside. Many young Americans feel that economic unfairness is costing them a shot at a decent life. Such sentiments have long been widespread among the poor. What鈥檚 new is their prevalence among people who saw their parents achieve鈥攁nd expected for themselves鈥攕ome measure of prosperity, the people Chris Hayes calls the .鈥�

If Beinart鈥檚 argument is correct, it is another reason why respect for privacy and civil liberties is likely to remain high among the Millennial generation: those who push political debate beyond 鈥渁ccepted鈥� limits, and those who engage in protests that 鈥渄isrupt social order,鈥� are the people most likely to find the hammer of local, state, and federal level security forces coming down hard upon them. They are the people most likely to understand that civil liberties are not an abstract issue.

Young people, of course, do not rule the world. Does it make any difference that they appear to have attitudes making them less sympathetic to the national security establishment?

Beinart argues that it will make a very significant difference. First, he argues that the attitudes that Millennials are developing now are likely to persist. As noted above he argues that attitudes forged by early experiences are likely to calcify. Furthermore, he argues,

There is more reason to believe these attitudes will persist as Millennials age than to believe they will change. For starters, the liberalism of Millennials cannot be explained merely by the fact that they are young, because young Americans have not always been liberal. In recent years, polls have shown young Americans to be the segment of the population most supportive of government-run health care. But in 1978, they were the least supportive. In the last two elections, young Americans voted heavily for Obama. But in 1984 and 1988, Americans under 30 voted Republican for president.

Nor is it true that Americans necessarily grow more conservative as they age. Sometimes they do. But academic studies suggest that party identification, once forged in young adulthood, is more likely to persist than to change鈥�.

In the 2008 presidential election, Millennials constituted one-fifth of America鈥檚 voters. In 2012, they were one-quarter. In 2016, according to predictions by political demographer Ruy Teixeira, they will be one-third. And they will go on constituting between one-third and two-fifths of America鈥檚 voters through at least 2028.

Of course, attitudes towards privacy and the national security state tend not to break along traditional liberal-conservative lines, and to the extent that the Millennial generation becomes more economically liberal in the way Beinart describes, it will not necessarily become more pro-privacy and civil liberties. But it appears that for whatever reason, Millennials are becoming more pro-civil liberties鈥攁nd many of the generational dynamics that Beinart argues for in the context of the greater economic liberalism he sees would also apply to those issues.

I鈥檝e previously argued against the notion that there鈥檚 some 鈥渕assive generational shift in attitudes toward privacy鈥� with younger people not caring as much about privacy as older Americans. And Beinart鈥檚 argument implies that not only is there not a shift in that direction, but that we may be seeing a shift in the other direction. Of course the nature of 鈥済enerations鈥� and their political beliefs is a highly complex topic and it鈥檚 possible that Beinart is misinterpreting what is happening in ways minor or major. But if the basic thrust of his argument is correct, or at least it鈥檚 correct that Millennials are going to remain more skeptical about the national security state, then that is good news on the privacy front.