ICE鈥檚 Detention Oversight System Needs an Overhaul
Every day, ICE locks up over 20,000 people in a sprawling nationwide network of more than 200 detention facilities. The 老澳门开奖结果 believes that this system of mass incarceration of immigrants should be dismantled 鈥� it鈥檚 unnecessary and inhumane. For as long as ICE maintains its detention network, though, it has a responsibility to create an oversight system that is actually effective at detecting, addressing, and deterring abuse of detained people. Our analysis of recent ICE inspection documents shows that ICE鈥檚 inspection system remains ineffective at identifying violations by detention facilities and ensuring compliance with detention standards, allowing facilities with clear records of poor conditions, including some of the deadliest facilities, such as the Stewart Detention Facility in Georgia, to evade accountability.
Virtually all detention facilities are required to adhere to that establish consistent conditions of confinement and ensure minimum standards of care for people who are detained by ICE. ICE currently monitors compliance with these standards primarily through external audits performed by a private contractor called The Nakamoto Group. Nakamoto鈥檚 fitness to serve as ICE鈥檚 auditor has been called into question by multiple oversight bodies. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) that Nakamoto鈥檚 鈥渋nspection practices are not consistently thorough.鈥�
ICE employees in the field and managers at headquarters told OIG that Nakamoto inspectors 鈥渂reeze by the [detention] standards鈥� and do not 鈥渉ave enough time to see if the [facility] is actually implementing the policies.鈥� They also described Nakamoto inspections as being 鈥渧ery, very, very difficult to fail.鈥� One ICE official suggested these inspections are 鈥渦seless.鈥� The House Homeland Security Committee issued a similarly . In September 2020, the committee鈥檚 majority staff reported that Nakamoto 鈥渉as demonstrated a lack of credibility and competence.鈥�
We reviewed every inspection report that Nakamoto issued in 2021 and found that little has changed. The same problems identified by OIG and the House Homeland Security Committee continue to plague Nakamoto鈥檚 inspections.
First, virtually no facility fails their inspections. Even facilities that are deficient in 30 or more components receive a rating of 鈥渕eets standards.鈥� Moreover, we found that inspections fail to account for clear indications of poor conditions. For example, Nakamoto鈥檚 in Georgia found that the facility 鈥渕eets standards,鈥� identified only one deficient component in the standard of 鈥淐orrespondence and Other Mail,鈥� and stated that 鈥渢here were no areas of concern or significant observation.鈥� Yet more detained people have died at Stewart than any other ICE facility in the last four years; since May 2017, eight people have died in custody at Stewart. Felipe Montes, a 57-year-old man from Mexico, only a few weeks before Nakamoto鈥檚 inspection. Yet Nakamoto鈥檚 inspection failed to note any concerns about the provision of medical or mental health care or COVID-19 protocols at the facility.
Second, Nakamoto continues to conduct only pre-announced inspections, often remotely or partially remotely, making a meaningful audit all but impossible. Pre-announced inspections permit facilities to temporarily cure or mask deficiencies to pass inspection. (This is on ICE though, because they are the ones that .)
Third, Nakamoto鈥檚 detainee interviews remain flawed, often occurring in non-confidential settings where detainees will feel less free to speak their mind about detention conditions. We also found that detainee complaints are rarely taken seriously.
Finally, Nakamoto inspectors appear to continue to trust, rather than verify, the representations of jailers and ICE officers. For example, at the in Texas, one detainee housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU), which is how ICE refers to segregation or solitary confinement, 鈥渟tated he had not seen an ICE officer while housed in the SMU.鈥� Nakamoto accepted the facility鈥檚 documentation that 鈥淚CE officers routinely visit the SMU,鈥� even though 鈥淸d]ocumentation that an ICE officer had visited this particular detainee was not available.鈥�
These and other examples make clear that Nakamoto鈥檚 inspections lack integrity. As have indicated, it鈥檚 past time for DHS to terminate its contract with Nakamoto.
ICE鈥檚 detention oversight problem is ultimately bigger than Nakamoto. ICE must ensure that it holds facilities accountable for violating ICE鈥檚 own standards. A meaningful inspection and monitoring system requires rigorous inspections of facilities and a commitment from the agency to impose sanctions, including contract termination, for facilities that do not pass inspection. And the public deserves transparency. We need to know which standards detention facilities are failing to comply with, and what consequences, if any, ICE imposes on them.
Effective oversight and transparency, though, are not enough. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service 鈥� ICE鈥檚 precursor agency 鈥� first rolled out its detention standards, the then-head of the agency that the goal was to 鈥減rovide safe, secure and humane conditions of detention.鈥� That goal is based on the flawed premise that detention can be safe and humane. It cannot. ICE鈥檚 record of , , and proves that point. Ultimately, ICE must shut down its mass immigration detention machine.
